The tin frontier:mining, empire and environment in Southeast Asia, 1870s-1930s by Ross, Corey
 
 
University of Birmingham
The tin frontier
Ross, Corey
DOI:
10.1093/envhis/emu032
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Ross, C 2014, 'The tin frontier: mining, empire and environment in Southeast Asia, 1870s-1930s', Environmental
History, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 454-479. https://doi.org/10.1093/envhis/emu032
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
I have email confirmation from the journal editor allowing open access 24 months after publication.
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Corey Ross
The Tin Frontier:Mining,
Empire, and Environment in
SoutheastAsia, 1870s–1930s
Abstract
This article investigates the interactions between culture,
technology, and environmental change during the tin
mining boom in colonial Southeast Asia, the world’s
dominant tin-producing region in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. It approaches the explosive
growth of the industry—above all in western Malaysia and
the “tin isles” of the Netherlands Indies—as a variation on
the concept of the commodity frontier: namely, one whose to-
pography comprised not just the surface landscapes over
which it expanded but also the various grades and depths of
ore beneath them. Like most commodity frontiers, this one
presented a series of resource windfalls tapped by successive
waves of entrepreneurs producing for a rising international
market. But beneath these overarching commonalities, two
interrelated factors lent it a distinctive dynamic: first, the
central role of new technologies in repeatedly pushing the
frontier into new underground strata and types of terrain,
and second, the ways in which this three-dimensional expan-
sion was animated by colonial ideologies of nature, race,
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waste, and industry that were deeply embedded in the project
of European imperialism.
INTRODUCTION
Tin is oneof theoldestmetals known tohumankind.Used since ancient
times mainly in alloy form (bronze, pewter), by the late nineteenth
century it had become a crucial component of industrial civilization.
Among its numerous applications, tin played an essential role in
several key sectors of industry, from textiles (mordants, dyes) to electri-
cal and mechanical engineering (solder, bearing metal) to military ar-
maments (gun metal). Most, however, was used for tin plating, or
coating sheets of steel or iron with molten tin to prevent corrosion.
And among the many uses of tinplate, the most significant was the
humble tin can. By allowing producers to conserve and transport food
surpluses over ever-greater distances, the tin can played a mundane
but critical role in processes of urbanization and industrialization in
the metropoles of the global economy. As its uses expanded, demand
for tin skyrocketed, especially in Europe: world production rose from
36,000 tons in 1874 to 124,000 tons in 1914. But since European
(mostly Cornish) reserves had been largely exhausted by this time, the
bulk of supplies came from overseas. The scarcity of nearby sources,
along with its military significance and lack of easy substitutes, made
tin an important strategic resource. It is ultimately the reason why the
Netherlands Indies government ruled the island of Bangka directly
from Batavia, and why the British intervened to establish the residency
of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1874.1
Tin was, then, quite literally a key element in the expansion of
Europe’s industrial empire into the tropical world. Few other metals
were so integral to the web of industrialization and mass consumption
yet so reliant on trade from tropical territories—above all the western
foothills of theMalaysianpeninsula and the “tin isles” off the southeast
coast of Sumatra. These areas witnessed an explosion of tin production
after the1860s, andtogetheraccountedforover two-thirdsofworld sup-
plies by the turn of the century.2 Here, as in many other parts of the
world, the quest for mineral resources was one of the chief incentives
behind territorial conquest. It was also one of the dirtiest and most
labor-intensive of economic activities, bringing major social and envi-
ronmental upheaval in its wake. While the immediate mining districts
bore the ecological brunt of the industrial world’s burgeoning appetite
for tin, thecomplexrippleeffectsalsoalteredforests, rivers, andpatterns
of land use throughout their hinterlands. Although mining in South-
east Asia (as elsewhere) has remained a relatively understudied aspect
of the region’s environmental history compared to its vast forests, plan-
tations, and rice frontiers, the tinboomdrove a far-reaching set of social
The Tin Frontier | 455
 at U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 on Septem
ber 29, 2014
http://envhis.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
andenvironmental transformations thatprofoundlychanged thephys-
ical, ethnic, and cultural landscape.3
This article outlines the growth of Southeast Asia’s tin industry
as a dynamic interaction between imperial power and colonized envi-
ronments. It has two overarching aims: first, to outline the economic
and technological development of the industry and its alteration of
the natural systems in which it was embedded; and second, to consider
morebroadlywhat it tells us about contemporarynotions of nature and
efficiency, and how they were linked to racialized justifications of colo-
nialdomination.Asagenerationof scholarshiponEuropeanempirehas
shown, the aspiration to control and profit from colonized territories
opened up vast opportunities not only for traders and investors but
also for a host of scientific and technical experts. The twin deployment
of financial and intellectual capital powerfully reshaped landscapes,
socioeconomic relations, cultural norms, and forms of political rule
throughout Europe’s colonies. In Southeast Asia as elsewhere, technol-
ogy represented not just a “tool” of empire but a broader mode of
empire—one in which large-scale environmental transformation was
not a by-product but an integral part.4
Moreover, as this article emphasizes, the development of the tin in-
dustry also illustrates how culture and ideas interact with material
and economic factors to shape the character and consequences of com-
modity production. If the study of commodity chains has furnished an
invaluable set of tools for examining the socioeconomic and environ-
mental linkages bridging increasingly distant sites of production and
consumption, the focus on such longitudinal and largelymaterial rela-
tionships can easily lose sight of the many “lateral” interactions with
social institutions and the prevailing ideas and values that shaped com-
modity production.5 In an ideological context inwhich a people’s level
of “civilization” was largely defined by its mastery of the biophysical
environment, the ability to harness nature’s bounty was as much a
measure of a society’s fitness to rule as it was a source of material
wealth. During the heyday of colonial rule, Europe’s industrial prowess
simultaneously permitted and served to justify its global preeminence.
In the interest of exploring thesebroader dimensionsof the Southeast
Asian tinboom—aswell as suggestingcomparisonswithother instances
of resource extraction—this article employs the time-honored concept
of the “commodity frontier,” an advancing boundary of trade, political
control, investment, and (sometimes) settlement that together re-
shaped environments and the ways in which people perceived and
used them.6 Like commodity frontiers in general, this one had its pio-
neers and latecomers, its phases of expansion and consolidation, and
it tended to reward predation over prudence. Like mining frontiers
more specifically, its multidimensional expansion—both outward
across the surface landscape and downward into lower depths and
grades of ore—gave it an unusually provisional character, closing and
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reopening as technological advances made previously unworkable de-
posits both physically and economically exploitable. Yet for all these
commonalities, the development of Southeast Asia’s tin mines also
demonstrates how local peculiarities shape the ecologies of resource ex-
traction. If many of the basic economic processes were familiar, their
meaning and effects were refracted by contemporary ideas about race,
waste, and efficiency that fundamentally structured colonial society.
THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN TIN FRONTIER
The string of alluvial cassiterite (tin oxide) deposits stretching from
Larut, the Kinta Valley, and Kuala Lumpur to the islands of Bangka
andBelitungmarkedtheworld’sprimary tin frontierduringthe latenine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. I use the term guardedly, and in
full awareness of its many connotations, above all the unavoidable
Turnerian associations with successive waves of American pioneers
movingwestward to create a new civilization in the former wilderness.7
But leaving aside Turner’s social-evolutionary logic, let alone his argu-
ments about how it shaped the American character, the frontier
concept is useful here for suggesting an interlocking set of economic,
social, and cultural conditions that are either absent or less pronounced
in other circumstances. As Walter Prescott Webb later formulated it, a
defining characteristic of a frontier is the availability of resource “wind-
falls” seemingly there for the taking.8 Thesewindfalls—land,wood, soil
fertility, minerals—generally attract a transient population of pioneers
and speculatorswith an instrumental attitude toward the landandwith
both the means andmotivation to move on once the assets of any par-
ticular locality are exhausted, thus repeating the cycle of extraction and
driving the frontier onward. In turn, this ability to escape the conse-
quences of one’s actions, often underpinned by a weak state presence
and an ideology of unending resources, imposes few social restraints
against destructive behavior and even fewer obligations to cover the
costs of depreciation—a tendency magnified wherever the frontier
is sparsely populated or regarded as idle “wilderness.” If one way of
seeing a frontier is as a transitory boundary of settlement, trade, or
technology, another is as a set of conditions that encourages short-term
extractive behavior over other forms of land use.
Much of colonial Southeast Asia was a “frontier” in both senses.9
Outside themain centers of population (above all Java), landwas abun-
dant and the state’s power precarious.Well after the turn of the century,
the bustling towns and mining camps of Malaysia were still viewed as
“mere patches” in the vast expanse of forest “that sweeps from one Sul-
tanate to another, and is only limited by the sea.”10 In such a seemingly
endless wilderness it was relatively easy for commodity producers to
move on once resources were depleted in any given area.
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The early growth of the tin industry clearly exhibited these character-
istics. On theMalaysian peninsula and Bangka,Malays had longmined
tin via several methods. The simplest was panning in streams with a
dulang, or large wooden dish. More common was the creation of a
lampan, or ground sluice, which essentially involved clearing the area
above the would-be mine, digging a channel from a nearby stream to
divert the water through a deposit and then treating the pay dirt
(karang) in the channel. As the light sediment washed into a tailrace,
theheavy tin sandwas retainedbya series of small damswhere itwaspe-
riodically scooped out and concentrated in a sluice box (palong). Both
methods were remarkably lucrative on unworked tin fields where
the cassiterite particles were heavy enough not to be washed away.
Neither, however, could tap the deeper ores just above the bedrock. To
reach these deposits, miners dug open pits (lombongs) several meters
deep, usually upward into a hillside so they could wash the pay dirt in
a channel below. All of these techniques worked within tight con-
straints. Panning and ground sluicing were only feasible on slopes in
close proximity to streams, whereas lombongs could scarcely go below
the groundwater level andwere likewise dependent on streams for con-
centrating the pay dirt. Essentially, the early Malay tin frontier was
limited to shallow deposits on the sides of foothills that benefited
from good drainage and easy access to water.11
In many respects the arrival of Chinese kongsis (commercial syndi-
cates fueled by “coolie” labor) represented a second wave of pioneers
who tapped another windfall by extending the frontier both outward
anddownward. First onBangka (fromthe late1810s) and then inMalay-
sia (fromthe late1840s), their key innovationwas theChinese chin-chia,
a traditionalwoodenbucket-chainmechanismdrivenbyawaterwheel,
whichcould removeup to3,000gallons (13,650 liters) ofwater perhour
and allowed miners to reach deposits 10 (and sometimes up to 25)
meters deep. Apart from the attainable depth, the technique was
broadly similar toMalay open casting. After the clearance of all vegeta-
tion, the retention of any hardwood for charcoal, and excavation to the
water table, a nearby stream was diverted to drive the water wheel and
the waste overburden was piled around the mine head to keep rainfall
from running into the pit. As miners burrowed into the hillside, they
raised the pay dirtmanually, concentrated it in sluice boxes, and gener-
ally smelted the dried orewith charcoal fuel on site or at a nearby smelt-
ing house. The waste tailings were simply washed downhill and
deposited on the worked-out area below. Chinese kongsis formed the
backbone of the industry during its rapid expansion in the late nine-
teenth century. On Bangka, they had already made tin the third
largest East Indies export. In Malaysia, they quickly dominated the tin
fields of Perak and Selangor, unleashing veritable “tin rushes” in Larut
frommidcentury and in the Kinta Valley from 1880 onward, the latter
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quickly mushrooming into the world’s single largest tin field once the
railways came in the 1890s.12
But Chinese mining was also restricted by the need for regular water
supplies. The water-wheel chin-chias were only deployable near
streams, were no use during droughts, and were not powerful enough
to keep the mines dry in heavy rains. On Bangka in particular, whose
many small fast streams quickly emptied in the dry season, water
posed the single greatest constraint on tin production. As one contem-
porary remarked, “Bangka is rich in rivers butpoor inwater.”13Not even
the construction of reservoirs—a crucial prerequisite to working many
sites on the island—could guarantee adequate supplies. Although this
problemwas less extremeon theMalaysianpeninsulawith its largerwa-
tersheds, prolonged dry spells also caused mine stoppages there.14
Chinese opencast techniques overcame only some of the constraints
that had bounded the earlier mining frontier.
All of thesemethodswere extensive and correspondingly destructive:
they worked the shallowest and most accessible deposits and quickly
abandoned them, leaving denuded and severely eroded hillsides in
their wake. As the industry expanded in the late nineteenth century,
both the aesthetic and material costs were increasingly manifested in
pockmarked and scarred landscapes, abandoned wastelands, and silt-
laden rivers. “Being full of large holes, and covered with an excavated
soil of gravel and sand [. . .] such land is a great eyesore, and gives a
bad impression of the country to the casual traveler,” noted a visitor
to Malaysia in 1904.15 As production rose, the valuable Dipterocarp
Figure 1: Yong Phin Open-Cast Mine near Taiping, 1908. Credit: ArnoldWright and H. A. Cartwright, eds.,
Twentieth-Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources
(London: Lloyds, 1908).
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forests near the mines also paid a heavy tribute to the smelting ovens.
“There are certainly few mining operations that run in such cavalier
fashion as the tin mines on Bangka,” remarked a medical officer in the
1870s. Neither the permanent dereliction of large areas, nor the “ruth-
less devastation of the forest,” nor any attempts to replant them were
givenseriousconsideration.16Similarconcernsemerged inMalaysia, es-
pecially Larut, whose mines had severely depleted the forests within a
20- to 30-kilometer radius by the end of the 1870s. Attempts to slow
the damage—first by banning inefficient smelting ovens, later
through more sweeping forest regulations—were of limited effect. In
1906 the Malaysian mines still paid no duty on the half million tons
of wood they consumed annually, and Bangka lost an estimated two-
thirds of its forest between the mid-nineteenth century and the
1920s.17 Ultimately, the most important reprieve for the woodlands
came not from early conservation measures but from the coal-fired
smelters built on Pulau Brani island near Singapore in 1890, followed
by smaller works at Butterworth and Penang.18
Waterwayswere also acutely affected asmine tailings clogged streams
and eventually worked their way into the major riverine arteries. By
1885 ore was no longer brought to the coast down the heavily silted
Larut River, necessitating a rail link from Port Weld to Taiping. During
the Kinta Valley boom of the 1890s, uncontrolled tailings emissions
threatened not only the riverine environment but also the industry
itself, which still depended on the ever-shallowing waterway for trans-
port. The Kinta Valley Railway, completed in 1896 between Ipoh and
Telok Anson, was explicitly built to obviate the need for navigating
what was increasingly written off as a doomed river. As the 1896 Perak
Annual Report unsentimentally put it, “The competition of the Kinta
River is still being felt, but should decrease as the higher part of the
river becomes silted up by the operations of the miners.”19
But given the importance of tin revenues for the FMS and East Indies
authorities, itwaseconomicrather thanecologicalconcerns thatcaused
the greatest apprehension. The problem, as many saw it, lay in the
growingdisparity between the industrial scale of demand andprimitive
methods of extraction. Bangka, noted one contemporary, “is for
Holland like a hen that still lays golden eggs but which sacrifices a bit
of itself with every egg, so that one can foresee a time when there is
nothing left but a dead skeleton. It is therefore an imperative duty to
ensure that this moment is delayed as long as possible through the
most systematic, thrifty and gentlemethod of exploiting the still avail-
able ores.”20 Once it was clear that themajor tin fields of the region had
all been discovered (if not yetworked), the specter of decline could only
be banished by expanding the tin frontier in several directions: into
deeper strata, into poorly watered areas, and above all into lower
grades of ore that could not return a profit via current methods. In
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short, theexploration frontierhadtobe replacedbya frontierof techno-
logical innovation.
THE INDUSTRIAL FRONTIER
Calls for “modernizing” Bangka’s tin industry could already be heard in
the 1850s (concurrent with the start of operations on nearby Belitung),
andmushroomedby the1870s amid concerns about futureproduction.
They soon resonated in Malaysia as well, where they culminated in an
1895 Mining Code that deliberately encouraged European investment
by granting secure tenure and distributing mineral concessions in
large tracts suitable only for sizable enterprises. The aim was to make
profits where older methods could not. Contemporaries estimated
that lampanning was viable on only 2 to 3 percent of a given plot. Even
Chinese open-cast techniques recovered only half the available ore.
Through technological innovation, so it was argued, miners could
widen and literally deepen the tin frontier by tapping low-grade depos-
its and even reopening worked-out wastelands.21
The problemwas thatmost early attempts tomodernize the industry
were lessons in what not to do. Although the mines on Bangka (owned
by the East Indies government) and the famous Billiton Maatschappij
on Belitung (forerunner to the multinational BHP-Billiton) proved
that European firms could make handsome profits, their actual opera-
tions relied almost entirely on Chinese laborers and their traditional
methods.22 By contrast, the first wave of European entrepreneurs who
flocked to Malaysia in the 1870s and 1880s generally imported mecha-
nized techniques from elsewhere, and nearly all were failures.23 Rather
naively, most assumed that highly capitalized systems (with teams of
surveyors, engineers, steam equipment, etc.) were inherently superior
to labor-intensive methods. But as the British Resident of Perak re-
marked in 1893, “After possibly a series of great hardships to the staff
and disasters to the company, it is found that the tin raised is infinites-
imal in value when compared with the rate of expenditure. . . . The
company is wound up and the State gets a bad name with investors,
and the only people who really enjoy themselves are the neighboring
Chinese miners who buy the mine and plant for an old song and
make several large fortunes out of working on their own ridiculous
and primitive methods.”24
It is an intriguing remark, atoncedenigratingnon-Europeanmethods
while conceding their commercial effectiveness. Indeed,many colonial
officials found it consternating, even disconcerting, that European
firmsshouldfind it sodifficult toprevailover theirChinese competitors.
But if the subversion of presumed civilizational hierarchies (on which
more later) was one cause for concern, the main worry was that these
techniques would inevitably render themselves obsolete by depleting
the rich, shallow deposits within their reach. By the turn of the
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century, attempts tomodernize the industry thus revolvedaroundthree
main elements: new laws to facilitate concessions for large firms, realie-
nating concessions that were left unworked, and improved control of
water resources.25 Thefirst twomeasureswere effectively a formof com-
mercial discrimination against small Chinese outfits andwere followed
by ordinances against opium use, gambling, and the so-called truck
system.26 The third measure sought to lure investors by precluding
private monopolies of water supply and thereby making the business
of resource extraction more predictable. But despite such efforts it re-
mained difficult to attract investment and all but impossible to
compete with Chinese kongsis on labor costs given their dominance
of coolie recruitment networks. This inability of European firms to
adopt capital- or labor-intensive methods as a means of breaking into
the industry eventually prompted them—much as their counterparts
in the American West—to implement resource-intensive methods
instead.27
The solution was hydraulicmining, which targeted low-grade depos-
its in which the Chinese andMalay competition was uninterested. The
basic method is simple. Water is collected in a reservoir at altitude and
piped to the mine face where high-pressure monitors wash entire hill-
sides down sluices, sometimes with the aid of water- or steam-powered
gravel pumps to elevate the wash dirt onto raised chutes. Though
ancient in conception, it had been perfected in the gold rushes of Cali-
fornia andVictoriaduring the1850s and1860s.28Despite beingbanned
in California in 1884 as excessively destructive, hydraulic mining was
introduced near Ipoh in 1892 and became more widespread around
the turn of the century. Its crucial advantage was minimal labor input
per ton of earth moved. At the pioneering Gopeng mine, for example,
water was diverted from a nearby river along a 2.5-mile watercourse
and5miles of pipe to a 2-inchmonitor nozzle. Ten to twelveChinese la-
borers broke up the mine face and washed the pay dirt into a nearby
ditch, where some forty Malay and Tamil women panned for ore
while ten more workers washed the accumulated tin sand in sluice
boxes.29 The basic technique was similar on Bangka and Belitung:
huge monitors capable of removing 50 cubic meters of earth per hour
washed entire hillsides into tailraces where suction dredges (spuitbag-
gers) pumped the slurry onto raised chutes.30 This combination of hy-
draulic cutting and gravel pumping made earthmoving far cheaper,
costing only thirteen cents per cubic yard (ca. 1.25 tons) compared to
at least sixty-one cents by traditional open-cast techniques. By 1916–
17 it accounted for around half of all earth moved in Belitung’s mines
(ca. 1.25 million cubic meters). In Malaysia the proportion of miners
in hand-dug pits fell from three-quarters in 1911–15 to only one-third
by 1921–25.31
Hydraulicking andgravelpumping thusdrovea twofold expansionof
the tin frontier: first, into areas more distant from watercourses; and
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second, into lower grades of ore. In the process, the very definition of a
“deposit” became as much a question of technological application as
geological serendipity. Whereas hand-dug open casts in the 1890s re-
quired a minimum 3 pounds of ore per cubic yard for profitability, hy-
draulic mines worked deposits only one-sixth as rich, especially as
prices gradually rose after 1900.32 By 1908 it was generally agreed that
“The day when the Federated Malay States might be regarded as the
happy hunting-ground for the small miner seems to have passed, and
Figure 2: Cutting a 320-foot face at the Bruseh Hydraulic Tin Mining Company, ca. 1908. Arnold Wright
andH.A.Cartwright, eds.,Twentieth-Century Impressions of BritishMalaya: ItsHistory, People,Commerce,
Industries, and Resources (London: Lloyds, 1908).
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the future of the tinmining industry in the States will depend upon the
economical development on a large scale of low-grade propositions.”33
If the advent of hydraulic mining thus carried considerable social
costs for small operators, its ecological costs were similarly steep. In
many ways it represented what Tim LeCain has called a “mass destruc-
tion” technique, wherein miners worked ever-lower grades of ore by
shifting ever-greater burdens onto the environment.34 As was also the
case with the copper mines LeCain has studied, the key characteristic
of this system was not the reduction of labor costs per se (which it
also achieved), but rather a dramatic increase in throughput by means
of a highly indiscriminate method of resource collection that chewed
up and spat out much more than what it targeted. Contemporaries
noticed the shift: “the whole mass of the hill, rich and poor, hard and
soft, is served alike; all is removed and passed through sluice boxes.”35
As lower grade deposits came into production, the ratio of ore to
tailings shifted accordingly. For every kilogram of tin produced, five to
six times more waste soil was washed away.
And where did all these tailings go? They ended up in vast “dead
zones” and ultimately in the rivers, just as in California.36 Although
local rivers had long suffered from lampanning and open-cast effluents,
the advent of hydraulicmining greatly exacerbated the problem. As the
discharge of tailings rose, especially in Perak, streams that had been
“clear as crystal” in the 1870s turned into muddy, meandering water-
courses “the colour and consistency of tomato soup.”37 Numerous riv-
erbeds were raised by several feet, some by several meters, increasing
the frequency of floods and covering agricultural land downstream
with sterile tailings. Among the worst affected was the Sungei Raia, a
tributary of the Kinta River. Despite attempts to dredge its channel
and stabilize its banks, the continued deposition of sand and silt on
the river plain gradually transformed a large rubber estate into a
marsh of lagoons and swamp grass.38 Frequent flooding in the urban
centers was a particular concern, especially after the “great flood” of
1926, which inundatedmuch of Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur and triggered
major canalization and flood retention works.39 There were even cases
of mine tailings killing off entire settlements. Balun Bidai, a village of
two thousand padi farmers near themouth of the Tumboh river, gradu-
ally became a swamp in the 1900s as the river silted up. Evenmore dra-
matic was the fate of Kuala Kubu, a market town that was eventually
relocated after being buried under 5 meters of tailings washed down
the Selangor River from mining operations in the Peretak hills.40
There is also evidence that tailings damaged shad fisheries along the
west coastofMalaysia.Amiddecliningcatchesaround1920,oneofficial
repeatedly “pickedup these fishbyhand in adying condition apparent-
ly choked by silt in their attempt to ascend the rivers.”41
Simplyput, the costs ofminingwerepassedon toothers downstream.
Andwhatmade the siltationproblem so intractablewas thedifficulty of
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repairing the damage once it was done.Many of the worked-out sites—
devoid of all topsoil and vegetation, often nothing more than exposed
rock and regolith—were virtually impossible to stabilize and continued
to erode at a rapid pace.OnBangka, thehundreds ofwashing sluices left
vast flats of sterile sand where vegetation could scarcely take hold even
after decades.42 In Malaysia, it was estimated in 1939 that the mines
were still annually depositing 16 million tons of silt (nearly twice as
much earth as was removed for all three tunnels of the Channel
Tunnel project) into the rivers of Perak and Selangor, much of it from
abandoned sites.43 Even after the watersheds were stabilized, the silt
still took decades to clear from the rivers. As a 1928 report onMalaysia’s
rivers noted, “Today the country is facedwith theproblemof dealing by
curativemeasureswith a disorder, which in thenature of things is pecu-
liarly amenable to preventive measures, and which, had adequate pre-
ventive measures been taken in the past, need never have attained
very serious proportions.”44 By the time a new Drainage and Irrigation
Department was founded in 1932, it could do littlemore than remedial
work,dredging,channeling,andstraighteningwatercourses intoclassic
“organicmachines”bearing little resemblance to theirprevious riverine
ecosystems.45 Indeed, the legacies ofwasteland erosion and accumulat-
ed silt persisted long after the colonial period. Studies in the 1990s still
found that sediment loads on tributaries of the Klang River increased
Figure 3: Ipoh during the Great Flood of 1926. Credit: www.ipohworld.org.
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nearly fivefold as they ran through derelict mining sites, whose sedi-
ment yields were over eighteen times higher than even disturbed
forest catchments.46
These defaced mining landscapes were situated at one end of a long
chain linking the kitchens and factories of the industrialized world to
the forests of Southeast Asia. For many years their remote location
and indispensability for colonial coffers allowed them to operate with
scant regard for the damage they caused. On Bangka and Belitung, the
quasi-official status of the industry essentially gave it a freehand. InMa-
laysia, where early attempts to retain effluents led to “serious friction
between theMines Department and theminers,” the creation of a Tail-
ings Commission effectively meant self-regulation and lack of enforce-
ment.47 During the First World War even these lax regulations were
loosened to maintain production.
Over time, however, the dire consequences for the region’s rivers
posed a new set of constraints on the industry. For one thing, the
damage increasinglyattractedregulatoryattention,especially inMalay-
sia. A 1922 Control of Silt Enactment—by far the oldest such provision
in the British Empire—was soon followed by a ban on hillside mining
above the 250-foot contour.48 In 1928, two years after the “great
flood,” a further enactment required permission to dispose of all over-
burden and tailings on any given site.49 As regulations tightened, re-
source depletion also grew more acute. By the mid-1920s, engineers
agreed that the hydraulic frontier had closed. There were few suitable
areas for new reservoirs, and miners had already cut down most of the
workable hill sites.50 But as the soils and streams of the foothills were
showing signs of exhaustion, world consumption of tin—and the
prices it fetched—continued to rise, surpassing prewar levels by 1920
before peaking at 193,000 tons by the end of the decade.51
Everything pointed to a new frontier in the lowlands, especially in
swampy areas like the lower Kinta Valley or Bangka’s estuaries where
earlier techniques were inapplicable. The solution was the bucket
dredge. Having already chewed up river bottoms from the Antipodes
to California, the first dredges arrived in Malaysia just before the First
World War and systematically began eating their way across the river
valleys of Perak and Bangka during the 1920s. By 1930 the hundred or
so dredges operating in Malaysia accounted for 30 percent of its tin
output, rising to over half by 1940.52 They essentially combined three
operations in one: a chain of buckets excavated and lifted the pay dirt,
a series of jigs separated the ore from the waste, and the tailings were
deposited at the rear, often into bunded paddocks on previously
worked land. Fueled by vast amounts of inanimate energy, they de-
voured entire landscapes in search of the tiny (and ever-decreasing)
fraction of resource that they valued. Even the early 300 hp dredges
could lift and treat up to 100,000 cubic yards per month, equivalent
to the output of around two thousand laborers. In the mid-1920s, new
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models the size of apartment blocks could process up to 300,000 cubic
yards per month to depths of over a hundred feet. Low operating
costs—similar to the cheapest hydraulic mines—meant that grades as
meager as two-thirds of a pound per cubic yard were profitable. Like
hydraulicking and gravel pumping, dredges extended the tin frontier
in two senses: they not only opened up whole new landscapes, but
also allowed miners to work low-ore grades including even long-
abandoned tailings dumps (e.g., at Larut).53
By utilizing different resources, dredging opened the “final frontier”
on the wet valley floors. In addition, by making a different waste foot-
print, it took some of the pressure off erosion-prone foothills and
damaged rivers. While there were a host of economic and political
reasons why colonial governments promoted dredging over other
methods, mitigating environmental damage also played a part, espe-
cially as the rubber industry expanded in Malaysia. It was, by and
large, less detrimental to local hydrology: contemporaries estimated
that no more than 5 percent of the excavated ground escaped in the
form of fine slimes. Dredging was also centered on swampy terrain un-
suited to agricultural production, and it could even ease the drainage
problems caused by mining and siltation upstream.54
But as is often the case, the solution for one set of problems brought
new ones. Although historians have suggested that dredging markedly
reduced the ecological costs of mining, it is more accurate to say that it
displaced them from the hillsides and rivers to the lowlands and
Figure 4: Tin bucket dredge north of Manggar, East Belitung, 1937. Credit: Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam.
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coasts.55 For one thing, the sites themselves were demolished in the
process, which mixed the ground from 25 to 150 feet deep and
thereby spoiled the topsoil with vast amounts of infertile subsoil.More-
over, evenwhen thefiner slimes (whichcontainednearly all theorganic
matter) and coarsermaterial were separated, the latter was often depos-
ited on top of the former, leaving the surface effectively dead. As the
dredges worked their way across valley floors, they left behind a land-
scapeof sterile sandhummocksandminiaturedunes that contemporar-
ies regarded as “permanently damaged.”56 They also extended mining
from terrestrial to marine environments. Bangka and Belitung quickly
became the world’s largest offshore tin producers as dredges tore up
the former alluvial river bottoms that had been inundated by rising
ocean levels after the last Ice Age. Along the coasts, too, they slowly ex-
cavatedwhole newwaterways that changed river and tidal flows as they
chewed their way inland.57
Despite repeated calls for the mandatory deposition of slimes on top
of sterile sands and the stockpiling of topsoil for subsequent redistri-
bution, the failure to enact such preventive measures meant that the
restoration of former mining lands (like damaged rivers) was limited
and remedial.58 InMalaysia,where rapidpopulationgrowthand theex-
pansion of rubber planting intensified land pressure, the Agricultural
Department conducted rice growing trials on dredged sites in the
1930s and later experimented with green dressings—especially woody
shrubs of theMimosa andCrotalaria genera—as ameans of kick-starting
plant succession (former open-cast or hydraulic sites were generally
deemed irretrievable).59 But despite some successes, the lack of binding
regulation meant that worked-out sites were usually left infertile and
derelict.60
Dredgingwas, then,another formof“massdestruction.”Likehydrau-
lickingandgravel pumping, it expanded the tin frontier primarily at the
expense of the biophysical environment. But as with these earlier inno-
vations, it was crucial for meeting the rising demand for tin. World
production peaked in 1929 (193,000 tons) and once again between
1937 and 1941 (211,000 to 242,000 tons), principally thanks to
output fromSoutheastAsia.61Althoughwartimedisruption (due to Jap-
anese occupation and thedeliberate sabotage that preceded it)made tin
one of the scarcest ofmajor warmaterials, it remained a crucial element
of numerous manufacturing processes.62 Dredging already accounted
for aroundhalf of tin production in the region, and it became themain-
stayof the industry after thewar.As real energy costs fell andelectrolytic
techniques for thinner plating pushed tin prices downward, dredges
enabled miners to process ever more minuscule percentages of ore
through the ever-greater substitution of inanimate power for human
energy.
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TECHNOLOGY, RACE, AND EFFICIENCY
In certain respects, the history of tin offers a particularly vivid illustra-
tion of the link between “mass destruction” and mass consumption in
the modern world. One of the basic fundaments of modern consumer-
ism is an unprecedented ability to escape local resource constraints by
drawing on distant raw materials—in world systems terminology, to
create “metabolic rifts” ofunequal ecological exchange.63 For industrial
Europe and North America, the growth of the global tin economy
helped expand their ecological footprint in two ways. Directly, of
course, the metal itself constituted an important material subsidy
from half way around the world, underpinning a range of vital indus-
tries and ending up in countless consumer goods. But indirectly, too,
it critically facilitated other subsidy flows linking the industrial metro-
poles to their increasingly far-flung areas of supply. As one of the
principal means for conserving and transporting the perishable goods
that they required, the tin can quite literally fed the rise ofmodern con-
sumer societies. By the late 1950s, world production of canned food
reached 18 million tons. In 1962 the United States alone produced
over 48 billion cans, which corresponded to around 257 per person
annually.64 Though few consumers knew it, their well-stocked cup-
boards were closely tied to the human-made badlands and silted rivers
of Southeast Asia.
Tinwas therefore a doubly important element in the globalization of
consumption and imperial networks of extraction. The complex con-
nections between the households of the industrial world and the sub-
soils of Southeast Asia in many ways typified the expanding resource
frontiers and thickening web of commodity chains that stretched
across the globe during this period. This is why the tin frontier
showed so many parallels to processes of social and environmental
change elsewhere.
But if the common themes are clear enough, it is the variations that
enable us to situate particular goods and industriesmore firmlywithin
their historical contexts. For the case of tin, one such variation relates
to industrial-eramining, and in particular the role of technological in-
novation as a key driver of mineral frontiers. By the early twentieth
century, the mining industry at large relied progressively less on the
discovery of new reserves and ever more on the ability to tap known
but previously inaccessible or unprofitable deposits. In Southeast
Asia as elsewhere, the progressive depletion of the richest deposits
promptedminers to work declining ore grades through greater mech-
anization and economies of scale.65 Admittedly, amineral “reserve” is
always a moving target, ever shifting in accordance with prices and
methods of extraction. By this time, however, most mines had
ceased to be treasure troves stumbled across by prospectors and
instead had become essentially anthropogenic sites, products of a
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particular constellation of closely interrelated factors: technological
innovations that made mines profitable at current prices, a political
system that privileged large enterprises and allowed many of the
costs to be passed to the environment, and a culture broadly willing
to countenance these costs in the name of “progress.” In this sense,
mining epitomized what Carl Sauer called “the doctrine of a passing
frontier of nature replaced by a permanently and sufficiently expand-
ing frontier of technology.”66
Other variations were rooted predominantly in sociocultural phe-
nomena, an understanding of which helps reduce the risk of economic
tunnelvision that cansometimesplaguecommodityanalyses.67The tin
frontierwas, like anyother space, notmerely aphysical stage forhuman
activity but was itself constituted by ideas and experiences, by “mental
geographies.”68 Much as the rhetoric of “idle lands” and profligate ab-
origines animated the colonization of the AmericanWest or Australian
interior, perceptions of the “waste” or “inefficient plunder” of resources
inEurope’s tropical coloniesbothpromotedandservedto legitimateEu-
ropean dominance.69 Viewed in this light, efforts to mechanize the tin
industry reflected not only commercial imperatives but also the colo-
nial ideology of the right, even duty, of Europeans to spread their
masteryofnature tobenightedpartsof theworld.AsBritishcolonial sec-
retary JosephChamberlain remarked in1895, “I regardmanyof our col-
onies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates” that must be
“developed for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of
the greater population which is outside.”70 Wedded to this outlook
was a quasi-moral objection against permitting a resource to lie idle if
it could serve human purposes. According to the sociologist Benjamin
Kidd, it was imperative to avoid “the inexpediency of allowing a great
extent of territory in the richest region of the globe—that comprised
within the tropics—to remain undeveloped.”71 This same attitude was
still manifest in a 1939 Malaysian mining report, which asserted that
anyone in control of ore deposits was “under an onus to permit the ex-
ploitationof thatmineral.”72 As elsewhere in the tropical world, impos-
ing industrial technology in SoutheastAsia’s tinfieldswas both a sign of
European power and a means of exerting it.
Understanding these relationships between technology, culture, and
power has been one of the foremost preoccupations of colonial and
postcolonial historiography in recent years. A central leitmotif has
been the concept of “technopolitics,” which has influenced work on
fields ranging from colonial medicine to agricultural development.
Among the many merits of this conceptual approach is its emphasis
on the inextricable links—often obscured by an ideology of scientific
autonomy—between control of the material and social world. As
Timothy Mitchell has formulated it, technopolitics is “a particular
form of manufacturing, a certain way of organizing the amalgam of
the human and nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the human, the
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intellectual, the realmof intentions and ideas seems to comefirst and to
control andorganize thenonhuman.”73 Since the1990s avast literature
has shown how the application of supposedly apolitical expertise,
usually in the name of “modernization” or “development,” carries fun-
damental political and social implications, even if scholars disagree on
the extent of its quiet hegemonic power.74
Seen through this lens, the modernization of Southeast Asia’s tin in-
dustrywasoneofmany exampleswhere the applicationof technical ex-
pertise, and assertions of its necessity and universal validity, served to
underpin imperial power. But perhaps more than most cases, it shows
how such expertise, far from merely parading in its “apolitical” guise,
was also overtly politicized, whether in the incessant complaints
about superficial Asian methods or the celebration of Western miners
as saviors of the industry. At one level, such evidence confirms thewell-
established argument that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
imperialism was strongly animated by ideologies that measured
human societies by their technical achievements.75 But to take this ar-
gument a step further, the evolution of the tin industry also suggests
that it was not just “machines” and technical rationality per se that
were regarded as the “measure of men,” but more generally the degree
to which human communities were able to control the physical envi-
ronment and extract wealth from it.
What was ultimately being judged in evaluations of differentmining
processes was not somuch their level ofmechanization as their level of
“efficiency.” We can get a broad sense of how this was defined from
Kidd’s 1898 treatise on The Control of the Tropics, which declared that
“the last thing our civilisation is likely to permanently tolerate is the
wasting of the resources of the richest regions of the earth through the
lack of the elementary qualities of social efficiency in the races possess-
ing them.”76 Efficiency, in this scenario, denotednot only a superior or-
ganizational and technical aptitude but also a deeper knowledge of the
natural world that permitted an appreciation of the full bounty it
offered for human design—provided that design be good enough.
Such ideas were deeply engrained in the imperial project, and what
made them so compelling was that they linked colonial authority not
only with technological prowess but also with contemporary notions
of race and environment. In the particular context of Southeast Asia’s
tin fields, Malays were seen to lack both elements of “efficiency.” Re-
garded by colonial observers as “an indolent, contented, thriftless, un-
ambitious, polite and peaceful race,” they supposedly possessed
neither the urge nor the know-how to capitalize completely on the
assets that lay under their feet.77 By comparison, Chinese miners were
seen tohave the former but not the latter: though industrious and com-
mercially astute, their technical capabilities confined them to rich
shallowdeposits.78 Only the colonizers purportedly had both themoti-
vationandability tomaximize theextractionofavailable resources, and
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this tendency to associate race and technology was magnified by the
close structural correspondence between the ethnic ownership of a
mine and the techniques it deployed. By the turn of the century, colo-
nial administrations made no bones about deliberately promoting
Western mining enterprise—though it was unclear whether the
variousmining codes, prohibitions on the “truck system,” and increas-
ing size of concessionary plots merely amounted to or were specifically
intended as a form of racial discrimination.79
Clearly, these ideological hierarchies of efficiency and waste framed
general perceptions of Southeast Asia’s tin fields. In certain ways they
also helped to promote the specific policy of modernization via
Western mining techniques, particularly as European entrepreneurs
turned to hydraulicking and gravel pumping in order to break into
the hitherto Chinese-dominated industry. When European hydraulic
miners faced theprospect of tighter environmental regulations, they re-
peatedly cited the “thoroughness” and “economy” of thesemethods to
counter what they saw as “a persistent prejudice againstmonitor work-
ings on the assumption that they cause immense damage.”80 The real
damage, they contended, resulted from extensive Asian methods that
did not exhaust the ground beforemoving elsewhere. As one hydraulic
mine manager boasted in 1905, “The most striking feature of mining
affairs at present is the losing of ground by the wasteful Chinese
miner, who has practically picked the eyes out of the country, and the
advance of the White miner, who is making excellent profits out of
ground the Chinese could not touch.”81 That Chinese miners were
not slow to adopt the hydraulic monitor and gravel pump did little to
undermine these racialized claims to superiority, and if anything was
taken as confirmation of Europe’s technological trailblazing and the
benefits it brought to subject peoples. Indeed, many of the same as-
sumptions framed the subsequent advent of dredging, which was cele-
brated for performing a racial role reversal in the working of low-grade
ores. “It had always been the case in alluvial working, whether in Cali-
fornia or Australia, that the patient Chinaman could come after the
hasty European and obtain a living from what the European had left,”
noted one engineer in the mid-1920s. The fact that “dredging now
took place in considerable part upon areas already worked and left by
the Chinaman” provided “a comfort more grateful than cocoa, and a
stimulation greater than that of wine.”82
These examples illustrate an important point: despite the vast
amounts of waste material they produced, hydraulicking and dredging
were not considered wasteful. On the contrary, they represented the
pinnacle of “efficiency” for coaxing profits from even marginal grades
of ore. What counted as profligate in the economic culture of colonial-
ism was not the systematic destruction of entire hills, rivers, and valley
floors for low-gradeore, but rather the inability tomakemeagerdeposits
pay—to allow them to run “largely to waste under the management of
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races of low social efficiency.”83 If waste therefore denoted a failure to
convert a potential resource into cash, then efficiency represented a
maximization of output regardless of the collateral effects. A survey of
the Malaysian industry summed up the matter as follows: “Efficiency
of mining really means the degree of completeness attained by the
miner in recovering the mineral from the ground that has been leased
tohim.”84Theonly thing that trulycountedwasprofitability in relation
tocurrentworldprices, including transport, fuel, andallothercosts.The
“mass destruction” technologies that European firms introduced in the
regionworkedbecause thecostswere shiftedto theenvironment,which
did not have a column on the balance sheet.
CONCLUSION
Obvious though it may seem, it is worth emphasizing that these
definitions of waste and efficiency were markedly different from—
even diametrically opposed to—those that have informed more
recent critiques of pioneer profligacy and “frontier economics.” The
core issue at the timewas notwhether natural resourceswere used spar-
ingly but whether they were exploited thoroughly. This meant that,
ironically, the “waste” of untouched ore in the ground represented a
greater transgression than laying waste to an entiremountain or water-
shed in the pursuit of low-grade ore. And what permitted the maximal
extraction of the targeted resource was of course the active utilization
of other natural resources—above all, fossil fuels and hydrological
power—that could be harnessed to this endeavor. Tapping nature’s
energy flows to capitalize fully on the other gifts of nature thus gave
this particular brand of efficiency a double environmental dimension,
though neither entered its cost calculation.
As some contemporaries noted, this narrow method of accounting
washardlyunique totinmining,orevenminingat large,but increasing-
ly characterizedeconomic thinking ingeneralduring thisperiod.85 “We
have lived so long inwhatwehave regarded as anexpandingworld, that
we reject in our contemporary theories of economics and of population
the realities which contradict such views,” remarked the ever-quotable
Carl Sauer in 1938. “Economics unfortunatelyhas become restricted in-
creasingly tomoneyeconomics, insteadof embracing the studyofWirt-
schaften, and largely has missed this ominous fact.”86 Keynes likewise
criticized the obsession with “the financial results” for turning the
entire conduct of life “into a sort of parody of an accountant’s night-
mare. . . . We destroy the beauty of the countryside because the unap-
propriated splendors of nature have no economic value. We are
capable of shutting off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a
dividend.”87
Theexpansionof the tin frontier in SoutheastAsia clearly exemplified
central elements of this broader economic culture. In various respects it
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also reflected distinctively imperialist ideas about race, technology, and
efficiency that served to justify colonial power. If the main drivers of
change were economic and material pressures common across much
of the global mining industry—above all declining ore percentages
and a corresponding need for economies of scale—the attitudes and
values that framed these processes nonetheless provided a significant
ideological support. The colonial condescension of bringing Europe’s
mastery of nature to the “underused” resources of the tropical world
not only abetted the entry ofmechanizedWestern firms into the indus-
try, it also condoned, even encouraged, the deployment of techniques
more wasteful, by other criteria, than what they replaced.
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